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WHY ZIMBAB\oiE NEEDS A LONG TERM INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 
Introduction: 
The hot-house pattern of government-spurred manufacturing growth experienced 
during UDI deepened Zimbabwe's already apparent external dependence and further 
distorted its sharply skewed resource allocation and income distribution. This 
article seeks, first, to outline the main features of that manufacturing sector; 
second, to suggest how a longterm industrial strategy could contribute to 
restructuring the national economy; and, third, to explain why, to implement 
such a strategy, the new government would have to make fundamental institutional 
changes to exert control over basic irtdustries, export-import trade, and 
financial institutions. 
Zimbabwe's distorted inherited manufacturing sector: 
Essentially a spillover of industrial investment by mining finance houses and 
transnational corporations in South Africa, 1 Zimbabwe's manufacturing output 
more than tripled in doll~ terms during UDI, from 16% to 25% of Gross Domestic 
2 Product. By the end of the 1970s, Zimbabwe boasted the second largest 
industrial sector in sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa, substantially 
larger in terms of output and employment than that of ,any of its independent 
neighbours. 
Table 1. 
Output of Manufacturing IndustiY as Percent of Gross Domestic Product and 
Exports, and Employment in Manufacturing as a Percent of Total Labour Force in 
. Southern African States in the 1970s 
State OutE!:!t 
As % of As % of llD12lorent numbers 7 of econ-
GDP exports omically 
active pop-
ulation J 
Angola (1973) 18 - 20 7 81,900 7-3 
Mozambique (1973) 14 n.a. 99,500 2.6 
Malawi (1977) 12 1.5 . 33.379 1.4 
Lesotho (1978) 2.2 n.a. 0 6,582 1.0 
Zimbabwe (1976~ 24.5 n.a. 302,346 e.8 
Botswana (1977 n .. a. n.a. . 4,150 1.2 
Namibia ( 1977) 1·4 50' 13,000 4·3 
Zambia ( 1972) 13.0 48,000 2.4 
Swaziland ( 1971 ) 16.0 75-:: 6,500 3,2 
Notes: •••• continued overleaf 
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Table I Notes continued 
Notes : 1 About half is in the form of processed meat, fish and vegetables for , 
export . 
~Mostly processed agricultural and forestry products (sugar , wood 
pulp , canned fruits , etc.) produced by transnationals and South 
African firms . 
~Obviously, this percentage is greatly influenced by the definition 
of''economically active population , " at best an estimate, taken from 
same . 
Source : Statistics from U.S. AID , Development Needs and Opportunities for 
Co- operation in Southern Africa (Washington, D. C. U. S. AID , 1979): 
Re Namibia, R.H. Green "Namibia in Transition: Toward a Political 
Economy of Liberation?" T. Shaw. 
The Rhodesian regime intervened , even more extensively during UDI than it 
had before , to foster growth of the isolated , landlocked country ' s manufacturing 
seotor. 3 It built on foundations constructed during the Federation Jecade . 
Then the settler colonial government had used tax revenues from Northern 
Rhodesia ( now Zambia) and migrant labour from Nyasaland (now Malawi) tc. 
create conditions attractive to foreign manufacturing investment . After 
UDI , the minority state lavishly employed typical state capitalist incestives , 
including guaranteed loans , tariff protection, and duty free import of 
machinery , equipment and intermedia~e materials . It __ nanced ext ensive 
economic infrastructure out of tax revenues saved by denying social services 
t~ the impoverished African population. It enforced legislation designed 
to coerce African workers to provide one of the lowest cost labour forces 
in the world . In 1977 , African wages in Zimbabwean manufacturing averaged 
U.S . $120 per month. This barely covered two thirds the cost of supporting 
a typical African- family in Zimbabwe's urban centres . 4 It roughly equalled 
a little over a half , a fourth and a sixth of the aver age wages paid ,5 
respectively , in South Africa, England , and the United States , the three 
main sources of foreign investment in Zimbabwe . 
Following the path charted_ by its apartheid neighbour to the South , the 
' Rhodesian regime created and financed a series of parastatals , semi-
. 
,autonomus state corporat~ons , which , ip close collaboration with dom~stic and 
·foreign capital , intervened directly in the economy to facilitate manufacturing 
growth . The two most important of the~e were RISCO , the Rhodesian Iron 
and Steel. Corporation, .. and the Industrial Development Corporation. 
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Jointly owned by the British government-controlled British Ste91 
Corporaticn ,6 which has extensive holdings in South Africa,7 and which 
provided technology and capital , RISCO invested directly to build up the 
nation's iron and steel industry. The regime controlled the Industrial 
Development Corporation ?f Rhodesia (IDC) in collaborftion with the major 
transnational banks active in the country, including Barclays, Standard , 
and Rhobank, as well as the South African mining finance house , Ang1o-
A~erican Corporation. IDC promoted industrial development through direct 
investment and loans, participating in projects that "left to itself, private 
8 
enterprise might find too long a term." Although resembling development 
corporations established throughout Anglo-phonic Africa , the IDC became 
rather more vigorous . After UDI , it provided a channel for government 
and foreign capital into heavy industry , helping to reduce the impa•~ of 
sanctions . It acquired two thirds of its holdings in motor assembly , 
• 
mining and metal products . The regime used IDC to meet strategic needs , 
supporting industries of mil~tary significance and investigating oil-from-
coal processes . It encouraged affiliates to export where possible . 
Together with Standard Bank , it qwned shares in the Export Credit Insurance 
Corporation of Rhodesia. Given this extensive government partiolpation and 
the peculiar features of the UDI economy, the manufacturing sector acquired 
five characteristics which reflecte~ , as well as aggr~7ated , the country ' s 
distorted externally dependence : 
1. Depending heavily on an import substitution strategy , it became 
increasingly geared to the luxury and semi-luxury .arp military require~ 
menta of the high income minority. Prior to UDI , manufacturing already 
produced most of the limited range of broadly consumed items which the 
impoverished Africans could afford • . After UDI , an i~creasing share of-its 
output went to satisfy European wants which had, till then~ largely been 
imported from South P1rica and beyon~ . 9 As the liberation war i~tensified, 
it focused more and more on military ·production, including local manufaeture 
of special items like the peculiar vehicles designed to avoid the full 
impact of land mines . 
' 
2. Despite UN sanctions , transnational corporate affiliates , operating 
through their South African ~eadquarters , 10 played an increasingly signi-
ficant role in providing capital, machinery , equipm~nt , and intermediate 
goods for the expanding manufacturing sector. This fostered growing 
concentration and external dependence . In the food and beverages industry, 11 
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which continued to produce over 20 percent of manufacturing output , for 
example , Anglo- American ' s indirectly controlled Rhodesian Breweries, which 
produces foodstuffs as well as beer , remained one of the ten largest 
Zimbabwean companies . Lever Brothers , an affiliate of British Unilever , 
produced cheese as well as detergents and soaps . A Nestles ' affiliate 
produced tinned milk and baby foods . Cococola and Schweppes' subsidiaries 
bottled and distributed drinks . Affiliates of Bx0ok Bond-Leibig, Tate and 
Lyle , British American Tobacco , and Anglo-American owned a predominant share 
of the agricultural processing industries . 
Foreign firms , often in partnership with parastatals , dominated the heavier 
industries associated with mining and metals manufacture , and provided 
capit al and technologies. 12 The U.S . firm , Union Carbide, produced ferro 
chrome . British Steel collaborated with RISCO to produce iron and steel. 
AECI, the South African affiliate of the British Imperial Chemicals 
Industries (lCI) manufactured fertilizers , and so forth • 
• 3. The manufacturing sector became increasingly dependent on imported parts, 
equipmen~ and intermediary goods . (See Table 2) 
Table 2. 
Imports as % of total inputs in main branches of industry , 1975 
InE!:!ts Imports Imports~InE!:!ts (2 $ million) ( 2 $ million) 
1 • Agriculture 163 . 7 13 .3 8. 1 
2. Mining 63 . 2 27 . 1 42.9 
3. Foodstuff 194.8 19 . 2 9.8 
4. Beverages , tobacco 36 . 4 4. 1 11 . 3 
5- Textiles 59. 8 32. 2 53 -7 
6. Cloth 39 . 4 13 . 1 33.2 
1- Wood , furniture 12 . 5 8. 3 66 . 4 
e. Paper 18 . 2 19. 7 108. 2 
~ - Rubber 2.7 e.o 296. 2 
10. Chemicals e.o 32. 0 400.0 
11. Petrochemicals 31 .1 20.7 66 .5 
12. Non-metalic mineral products 16 . 5 7. 0 42. 4 
13. Base metals 58 . 6 27.5 46 .9 
14. Metal products, machinery 32 .8 41.7 127. 1 
15. Electrical machinery 5-7 17 . 1 300.0 
17. Other manufacturing 2. 5 3.8 152.0 
12. Construction 108 .8 22 -2 21.2 
Source : UNCTAD and UNDP, Zimbabwe Towards a New Order - An Economic and 
Social Survey (United Nations, 1980) Annex III, Table 1, pp. 354-5 
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This increased the sector ' s dependence on South Afric ~-based industry. 
It provided a market for the expanding transnational corporate activities 
which , by the 1970s , contributed about 4~~ of South African manufacturing 
investment. 13Reports indicated that, as its economy became severely 
constrained by sanctions and foreign exchange shortages , a considerable 
portion of Zimbabwe ' s machinery had become outdated and relatively in-
effieient by the late '70s . 14 ~~would re~uire replacement to compete 
in the post UDI export markets . The Rhodesian regime , despite its 
intensified efforts , failed to stimulate domestic manufacture of machinery 
and equipment; that would have required far larger markets which the economy , 
isolated by sanctions, did not possess . Given the tiny domestic market , 
rendered still less effective by the impoverishment of the vast majority of 
Africans , even the textiles industry depended for expansion on sales to 
South Africa. When, in the economic crisis of the mid ' 70s , South Africa 
raised tariffs in response to South African firms ' demands for protection 
against imports , Zimbabwe ' s textile industry stagnated. 
4 . Expanding manufacturing production, located primarily in existing 
urban centres , ~gravated the uneven development of the national eoono~. 
About 7~~ of all manufacturing employment15 centred in Salisbury (47%) and 
Bulawayo (2~%) . A third of the remainder, mostly ass~~iated with the 
production of steel from local iron ore deposits , was located at Que Que. 
Four other urban centres accounted for over a third more (1~o of the total). 
The remaining 8% was scattered in eight smaller towns . TTLCORP , created to 
encourage dispersion of industries into the TTLs , effected almost no change 
in this pattern. Private firms, domestic or foreign, maximizing short 
term profit, located near existing markets , skills, and infrastructure 
centred in the heartland of settler colonialism. They had no interest in 
building new growth poles to spread productive employment opportunities into 
the rural areas. 
5. Manufacturing industries grew relatively more capital-, rather than 
labour-, intensive . They provided relatively few new jobs even for the 
growing numbers of rural dwellers who crowded into urban slums . Although 
the manufacturing sector provid~d about a fourth of the Gross Domestic 
Product, it employs 14% of all wage earners , barely 4% of the adult 
16 population. Paying relatively higher wages than other sectors , it 
particularly excludes women, who constitute only 4% of its labour force . 17 
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Transnational corporations , bent on selling their excess machinery and 
equipment , seldom redesign their industrial capacity to meet small economies ' 
factor requirements. Insofar as they invested at all in machinery and 
equipment i ndustries in Africa , they did so in South Africa , where the 
minori ty regime sought to reduce its dependence on black labour by the 
rapid introduction of sophisticated technologies . * 
-To sum up~then, . Zimbabwe ' s import substitution industry , nurtured by state 
intervention under sanctions imposed after UDI , became incr easingly geared 
to 1~ and semi- luxury production; concentrat ed and dominated b,y foreign 
firms with regional headquarters in South Africa; dependent on imported 
machinery , equipment and intermediary parts and materials; located in existing 
urban centres , aggravating uneven devel opment ; and capital- intensive , providing 
relatively few jobs . As one foreign observer remarked , the result was "hi gh 
entrepreneuruH returns , high pr ices and poor quality." 19 
The need for a long- term industrial strategy 
To overcome the negative impact of Zimbabwe ' s distorted inheri t ed pattern of 
economic growt h , an unevenness aggravated by the growth of import substitution 
during UDI , Zimbabwean planners will need to focus on t he formulation and 
early introduction of a long- term industrial strategy. Its purpose should 
be to restructure the economy,to attain balanced integrated development 
capable of reducing dependence on South Africa and providing increasi ngly 
productive employment opportunities and rising living standards for the low 
income populatioc. 
The United Nat ions document , Zimbabwe Towards a New Order , proposes criteria 
for incorporation into this kind of a long- term strategy. These include : 
( i) 
( ii) 
( iii) 
To pr ovide the opportunity for improving employment and earnings ; 
To provide the range of consumer goods that are needed to promote 
rapid improvements in the standard of living of the population; 
To produce the capital goods that are needed to sustain the production 
of needed consumer goods , the expansion of housing and the provision 
of ~ rious infrastructural services , such as transport , energy 
supplies and water; 
U. S. transnational corporations , for example , invested 80% of all their manufact-
uring and 97% of their basic industrial investments on the '>~hole continent in 
South Africa. 18 · · · · 
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(iv) To provide opportunities for minimizing foreign exchange expenditure 
on industrial products while producing, at the same time , a broad 
range of exportab~e products; 
(v) To provide opportunities for the rapid acquisition of skills by 
Africans at all levels; 
(vi) To provide a vital basis for the participation of the new Zimbabwe in 
a new programme of regional co-operation among African countries in 
southern Africa that will enable them collectively to reduce their 
dependence on South Africa. 
The achievement of these objectives would involve: 
(i) Major changes in the existing patterns of ownership and control of 
industrial assets; 
(ii) African control of the various public institutions that oversef the 
main directions of industrial development and the strengthening and 
expansion of this institutional framework; 
(iii) The rapid expansion of training programmes for Africans at all 
levels; 
(iv) The immediate appointment of Africans and selected foreign' experts 
to key management functions in commanding positions of the industrial 
sector; 
(v) Strict control of industrial technology and of the importation of 
machinery and technical equipment; 
(vi) A deliberate policy to change the composition of output in favour 
of basic goods that are needed to promote the economic and social 
welfare of the masses of Zimbabwe; 
(vii) A concerted attempt to foster small-scale and rural-based industries; 
(viii) A comprehensive legislative framework to set the stage for new 
directions and new orientations in industrial development . 
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Realisation of these criteria requires forging an intimate and balanced 
relationship between expanding industrial growth , increased agricultural 
productivity and rural development . 
(See Figure I) 
Industry A.griculture 
Toole and equipment __ ~ Raw materials 
" Markets for agricultural output <.-- for industry 
. \-· 
consumer necessities '~----------for export to earn foreign exchange 
. .............. ~ f or capital goods ~ncrease value of exports . 
through processing _ _.Foodstuffs for urban population 
. ----- , . Employ labour released fro~ ~ Market for manufactured goods 
eg.r-J&ul.-ture ~ --- - . Release labour 
--,\ 
I~ 
Figure I illustrates how expanded industrial output , on the one side of 
the balance, should contribute to increased agricultural productivity and 
rising living standards in rural areas in particular , as well as the 
economy in general . It should fabricate ~ growing range of consumer neces-
sities to meet the basic needs of l ow income rural dwPllers . It should 
manufacture tools and equipment a t appropriate levels of technology to 
augment productivity in peasant agriculture . Simultaneously, it should 
increasingly process agricultural exports to raise their foreign exchange 
value . Expansion of manufacturing should provide growing employment for 
workers released from the increasingly productive agricultural sector. 
On the other side of the balance, increased agricultural production 
(including increased productivity) i~ essential to industrial growth . 
Agriculture must grow raw materials for industry to avoid expanding 
imports. It must provide foodstuffs for the growing urban population 
associated with industrial growth. And it must expand the output of 
export crops to earn increased foreign exchange to buy machinery and 
equipment for planned new factories . At the same time , rising agricultural 
productivity should lead t o augmented employment and higher incomes in 
the rural areas, creating an enlarged market for the growing output of the 
manufacturing sector. 
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A long-term industrial strateBY needs to aim at ending external dependence 
and achievi~ this kind of balanced development throughout the economy . 
Over time, it should spread increasingly productive employment opportunities 
and rising livi~ standards into every sector . Figure II pictures the 
necessary relationship between ris ing productivity , expressed in terms of 
increased Gross Domes tic Product , and improved living standards which could 
be achie~ed over , say, a 20 year period . 
Figure II: ~~-!!~!atio~~~!E_ be~~~~~_l~~~~~ed I>Eodu~ti!i ~_i~~!?L~~ 
!!is~ng Living_~~~~rds Att~~!!ed_El_~~g~-t~~_l~du~~~~ 
~~~~~~of 20 _!~~ 
G1)P ::: }11. 
_____ .. .,.,... ~ 
----- ~ -~ _ z?ofo _ __ ·. 
1 
- ten" - - \ 
_____ "fn"~~es ro __ ---: to need. ~ 
---- ----.;I a acco:rdi.ng 0 
--- -p:ro'\f"l.v.e ·r-i 
-- - . 1. ser-rices ' - - - - '> t . 
_ s_o':a _ _ _ _ __ __ - - \ ~ 
lWages,_::d accordi~~ work~:_,__ _'_ ,8 
~j -·§ yrs ~.~ <-5 yrs -> 1 , - 5 yre -4 ~ 5 yrs ~ .:''-
Plan I Plan II Plan III Plan IV 
- ------- - - -20 years / 
Planned 
allocation 
of output/ 
incrme 
Annual investment should reach about 25% of National Income (by definition 
equal to GDP) to ensure implementation of carefully worked out intermediate 
plans . Each of these should cover 4 to 7 years (say 5 years , for 
convenience), l ong enough for major physical investments introduced to come on 
stream and become viable . ' Adjustments in the inputs and outputs of eaoh 1 
plan period may then be made in accord with concrete results in th~ 
preceding plan. Only as plans increase productivity through the augmented 
quantity and quality of investments can planners direct an increasing 
share of National Income to raising wages and social services. Wages 
should be paid to workers in accord with the actual quality and quantity 
of work they perform. Social services , paid to all in accordance with 
their need, may only grow as long as the national product expands . 
That expansion depends on the carefully designed investment of at least 
. 
a fourth of the Gross Domestic Product into physical agricultural and 
industrial projects, capable of increasing productivity. 
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Planners in a relat ively small economy like Zimbabwe ' s need to think of 
this kind of long- tern industrial strategy in two dimensions. The first 
concerns the best possible planned deployment of national resources -
physical resources, financial capacity. and the labour force - to construct 
the projects planned for each phase . The sec~nd dimension should take 
into consideration , given the economies of scale and required heavy capital 
expend! tures involved in basic .;.ndustries , the broader possibilities to be 
realised by integrating the national plans together with ~ose or neighbouring 
cquntries . 
. . - --
Zimbabwe alone , landlocked and endowed with a relatively small and 
predomi nantly low income population , probably could not build the basic , 
verticall y integrated industries required to end its dependence on South 
Africa and attanin self-reliant devel opment. Together with its neighbours 
- Mozambique , Tanzania , Zambia , Malawi , Angola , the :BLS countr ies and Namibia 
-however , Zimbabwe would benefit.from a land area larger than Europe and a 
population of 50 million. 
*It s total population is smaller in size and its per capital income 
is probably less than a tenth of that in a large modern city in 
developed countries. 
11/ •••• 
Population, Life Expectancy and National Product of Southern African States , 1970s 
Population ~ Life GDP GDP GDP 
expectancy 
. 
Area Mill.as at Growth rate Density at birth 1975 growt}l rate per capita 
000lan1 f1id 1976 1970- 75 People/ 1970-75 u.s. percent 197/) 
sq . lan (no . of ;years) $mill. 1960/ 70 1960/70 u.s. ~ 
Angol a 1246. 7 5. 5 0. 1 4-4 39 3476. 1 5. 1 1. 0 330 
3. 01 
. 
Botswana 570. 0 0 . 7 1. 2 44 342 .0 5.4 24 . 9 410 
' 
Lesotho 30. 4 1. 2 2. 2 39. 5 46 110. 3 3. 0 4. 0 1.10 
Malawi 118 . 5 5. 2 2. 3 43 . 9 41 758 . 4 5. 2 8. 9 140 
. 
Mozambique 783 . 0 9. 5 2. 4 12. 1 : 44 2687 .9 4. 8 - 2.0 170 
Namibia 824. 3' 1. 3 3.0 1. 5 49 891 . 3 5. 2 5. 2 470 '' 
Zi mbabwe . 390. 6 6.5 3-5 16. 6 52 2620. 0 4.7 5. 1 550 
' 
. . 
Swaziland 17 .4 0. 5 3. 2 28 . 7 44 273 . 3 8. 2 9-5 470 
Tanzania 945 . 1 15 . 1 2. 7 15. 9 45 2553 . 2 5. 4 4. 2 180 
' 
Zambia 752 . 6 5. 1 2. 9 6. 6 45 2231 . 4 4. 0 3. 1 . 440 
. 
Total/lverage 5678 .6 50. 6 
r .• 
4-93 ' 280 "· 2. 5 8. 9 45 1;s43 . 9 3. 3 
Republic of South Africa 1221 . 0 26 .0 2.6 21 . ~ 22 22224. 2 6. 2 2· 6 1240 
1 Includes the area of Walvis Bay. 
2 Migrant workers are included under their home countries . 
3 1 971 - 197 6. 
~Only figures in this column are based on World Bank sources , For Namibia the following procedure had been used: The country 
profile 1977 ratio GNP/GDP has been used on the 1975 GDP figure increased by 10% for inflation 1975- 76 . This figure has 
been divided with the population figure gj ven in the table . 
s Weighted average , using mid- 76 population as weights . 
t. Weighted average , using 1975 GDP as weights. 
Source: Southern African co- ordinating conference , "Economic Dependence , " Table 2 (Arusha: July, 1974) Demographic YearB6ok 
1976. (U.N. ) World Bank Development Report 1978 Statistical and Eqonomic Information Bulletin for Africa No. 10(ECA) . 
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The region possesses a wide range of agricultural and mineral resources, including 
oil, iron ore, copper, coal, and vast hydroelectric po~er potential . In the 
past, transnational firms, mostly operating from their regional headquarters 
' in South Africa, have exported this mineral wealth in crude form. 1m 
increasingly significant share has been shipped for processing to their 
South .A£rican manufacturing plants . (See table 4). 
Table 4. 
4a. 
Capacity for Refining Petroleum Products in Southern Africa 1976 
Petroleum 
' Products 
Angola Mozambieque Tanzania Zambia South Zimbabwe · 
.A£rica 
in thousand metric tons 
I Liquified 
Petroleum gas 7 7 6 9 59 NA 
Motor Spirit 51 80 117 180 3,504 " 
Kerosene 18 20 26 20 403 " 
Met Fuel 56 7 44 40 283 " 
Distillate Fuel 
oils 190 100 193 350 4,326 II 
Residual fuel oil 342 200 358 200. 3' 187 " 
:Bitumen 5 25 5 319 II 
. 
Parafin wax 220 " 
Total 601 ~22 111 122 121n1 "{1~ 
% of known regional 
total 1-4~o 2. 9% 1·~;6 2 · 2~ 82.2~ II 
Crude petroleum non~2 ) known reserves 179,000 none none none none 
Eroduction 1z121 
Source; United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1979 
( 1) Zimbabwe ' s refinery was cl~sed during UDI. 
(2) Ethanol , produced from sugar is said to provide 15% of Zimbabwe 's 
automobile fUel needs. 
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Table~· Iron and Steel Production and Consumption in Southern Africa , 1976 (in thousan~~e~r1c tons) 
Production South Zimbabve Angola Swaziland Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Tanzania Zambia 
Africa 
~ · r 
Steel 3 , 751 141 
Pig Iron 3 ,750 260 
Iron ore 2a800 ~8~ 1 2 6~43 1 2222 
Consumption 16, 0662 n . a . 17~ 2 
per capita 212 n . a . 2~ I 
(kilograms) 
Eotes : • including Namibia 
2 South Africa includes Botswana, Lesotho and Swazilann 
3 Angolan production for 1975 ' consumption for 197 4----
Source: United ~ations Statistical Yearbook , 1977 . 
2 2 18 25 101 . · 13 •. 
2 2 3 3 6 8 
Table 4c . Energy Production in·Southern Africa, 197t - (million kilowatts per hour2 
I'<'. ,..... 
I 
Type Angola Botewena Leeotho Malawi ,·:Mozambique _ Swaziland· Tanzania Zambia Zimbatwe South Africa2 
Total 1,300 '}~(th) 5!th) 1 318;; "': 1, 915·· 244 C85 7 ,034 5 ,653 79,087 
Hydxo 950 283 1,510 101 500 6 ,784 5,853 1 ,876 
Total 2 250 332 5 601 3 , 425 · 345 1,185 13,818 10,506 · 80 ,963 
?( of regional 
total 2 .~ 0. 3% _____ _ 0. 696 3. 5% "· 0 . 396 1. 2'1;6 14. ~6 10.8%. 83 . 496 
Notes: 1 1967 data: none shown after , probably because Lesotho was incl~ded in South African grid. 
) includes Namibia 
! excludes Kunene Dam ; 
~ Cabora Bassa project not operating at full capacity 
Source: United Nations Statistica Yearbook, 1977. 
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Table 4d. 
-- -- -
.. - --- -
- -
The C~~ptlo; -of Phosphatic Fertilizers in Southern Africa1 1276 (in thousand metric tons} 
Fertilizer Angola 
Phosphatic z ,3.5 
Nitro,t;Senous 11 . 2' 
Potash 6. 9" 
Total 
consumption 21 . 6 
% of regional 
consumption 1. ?t'~ 
'Notes: ' includes Namibia 
2 1974 
3 4. 1 in 1972 
., 1972 
- . 
t; 9.0 i? 1973 
.. 1973 
1 2. 7 in:. 1972 
~ :Botswana Lesotho Malawi 
1.0 1.0 - 3.2 
1.0 18.9 
3. 0 
2. 0 1. 0 25 . 1 
0. 1% o. 176 1 .~~ 
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1977 
Mozambique Swaziland ·Tanzania" Zambia 
2.9' 1. 5 10. 9 17 . 9 
- 6. 7~ 6.0 14 . 5 39.8 
1. 6 1 2.4 4. 3 6. 1 
11 . 2 9.9. 29 .7 63 .8_ 
o. 9';0 o.'f% 2.}96 5.f% 
Zi.EUal.we 
13 . 0 
80. 0 
33 . 0 
156. 0 
12. 3% 
South 
Africa 
362 
301 . 7 
130. 7 
953 . 4 
14. ']}6 -
' 
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In formulating a national long- term industrial strategy, Zimbabwean planners 
should consider the advantages of simultaneously integrating it with neighbouring 
countries ' perspective plans to build complementary basic industries, building 
on their respective comparative advantages. This would ensure that all 
participating states, including Zimbabwe, benefitted from the availability of 
an adequate range of resources and large enough markets to render viable 
basic industries , which none alone could afford to create . Furthermore , as 
Table 5 suggests , regional plan co- ordination would also enable the partici-
pating states to muster sufficient investable surpluses to finance the heavy 
capital costs of constructing such industries . The combinedhvestable 
surpluses 
Table 5 
Estimated Gross Domestic Production , Potential Investable 
Surpluses of Indpendent Southern African States Compared 
to South Africa 1975 
State Gross Domestic Product Estimated potential (u .s. $millions) investable surpluses {u.s. I mill ions} 
Angola 3476 . 1 869 . 0 
Botswana 342. 0 85 . 5 
Lesotho 111 . 3 27 . 8 
Malawi 758 . 4 189. 6 
Mozambique 2687 . 9 671 . 9 
Namibia 891 . 3 222. 8 
Swaziland 273 . 3 -68 . 3 
Tanzania 2553 . 2 638 . 3 
Zambia 2231 . 4 557 .8 
Zimbabwe 2620 . 0 6,2,2 . 0 
TOTAL 15943 . 9 3985. 9 
South Africa 2:2221 · 2 882~ . 2 
Note: Estimated as 25percent of Gross Domestic Product . 
Source : See table 
of Zimbabwe and its neighbours would be some six times gr~ater than those 
available to Zimbabwe alone . Over a 20 year period, despite exclusion of 
South Africa, assuming a plausible annual growth rate of the regional 
product of about six percent , regional investable surpluses could total about 
U. S.$150 billion • . ~is would finance construction of a s~fficiently wide 
range of basic industries to enable the participating states , together , 
to achieve developed country status in the course of the next half cen~. 
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Obviously, Should a liberated South Africa join together. with the rest 
of the countries in the region, on a planned mutually beneficial basis, 
the pace of regional industrialisation could be far more rapid~ 
These considerations suggest that Zimbabwean planners should, as soon as 
possible, begin to formulate a lo~term industrial strategy that would 
take advantage, not only of national, but also regional possibilities for 
• increasing productivity and raising living standards. This strategy should 
• focus on re-orienting old manufacturing industries and creating new ones 
to restructure the national economy in the context of regional economic 
development along the following lines:-
1. Rather than expanding import substitution industries which would further 
inevitably replicate and aggTavate distorted features of the national 
economy, it should plan to reorient old plantsand establish new ones 
to produce: 
a) Consumer necessities required to raise the living standards of 
low income group~ .(i) proce~sed fo~dstuffs, to ensure adequate 
storage and distribution of foodstuffs t~ughout all seasons to 
1 
all sections of the population; (ii) clothing, to meet the expanding 
demand resulting from higher incomes of the lo er income groups; 
(iii) simple sturdy , inexpensive furniture; (iv) low cost housing 
materials to permit construction of housing rapidly at reasonable 
costs. 
b) Machinery, equipment at appropriate levels of technology 
(i) tools, ploughs, carts and, as peasants acquire necessary capital 
and skills, parts, equipment and eventually entire tractors and 
agricultural machinery in adequate quantity to enable peasants to 
: ... 
rapidly increase their output on newly acquired land, increasing 
employment and incomes in rural areas; (ii) parts and equipment 
for standardised models of lorries and busses, including domestic 
producti•n of components, to facilitate public transport and 
collection of surplus agricultural produce and distribution of 
manufactured goods throughout the nation; (iii) in the second and 
third plan periods, more basic industries, linked into regional 
markets, resources and financial potential: e.g. iron and steel , 
drawing initially on already developed Zimbabwean an1 Angolan 
deposits, and eventually working out a broader pattern of 
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specialisation with Zambia , Mozambique and Tanzania; a patrochemicals 
industry , based on Angolan oil; copper and electrical equipment and 
supplies , drawing on expanding Namibian , Zambian and Botswa.rui. output . 
Wherever possible , national , and , increasingly , integrated regional planning 
\ 
should develop and utilise local and regional resources , rather than import 
crude and se~-crude materials . The domestic textile industry for example , 
should be geared to spinning , weaving and making .finished textiles and 
clothing out of domestically grown cotton, rather than importing synthetic 
polyesters and rayon. 20 This would expand demand for domestic cotton, 
1 
inc,reasing domestic employment and raising rural income levels . At a later 
stage , when a regio~l petrochemicals industry is developed and increased 
empl~yment is available in other sectors , it may be more rational to 
gradually introduce synt hetics . 
It wou~d be unfortunate , however , if Zimbabwe , in its efforts to expand 
use of national resources , bu1lt new industries to produce high cost 
outputs when neighbo~ring countries possess alternatives that could fill 
demand at lower unit prices . The pr~vious regime , for example , operating 
under constraints imposed by sanctions , proposed to build a thermopower 
plant using coal produced at Wankie, 21 the mine owned by the South African 
conglomerate , Anglo-American. The cost of the project is now estimated at 
about S1 000 million, almost double the total potential investable surplus 
produced by the entire Zimbabwean economy in one year. Its construction 
will require the import of expensive machinery and equipment, much of it 
from South Africa , accompanied by heavy foreign borrowing and increased 
dependence on transnational corporate bankers . To complete plans , 
introduced by the old regime and its transnational corporate collaborators, 
in the political conditions of the post- liberation era today , seems a 
I 
questionable entenprise . It would seem to make far more sense for 
Zimbabwe to plan together with its neighbours to create a regional grid 
to utilise the vast hydroelectric power potential of the entire region. 
This would enable it to draw on power already being produced by Cabora 
Bassa in Mozambique, Kafue in Zambia, and existing smaller projects , as 
well as taking into oonsideration potential power to be producer by the 
Kunene Dam in Angola and the Inga Dam in Zaire, and perhaps eventually 
the vast Stigler Gorge project propose4 for Tanzania. · 
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3. New industries planned in the context of a proposed long term strategy 
would ,not automatically be loca ted in existing urban centers in· accord 
with the dictates of short- term profit maximisation. This would simply 
further aggravate the distorted inherited pattern of uneven aevelopment. 
Instead , new plants should , ~s far as possible , be constructed as poles 
of growth to stimulate increased employment and r a ise productivity in 
less developed areas . Initially , in the first plan period , for example , 
food processing and production of materials for low cost housing might 
be carried out by developing existing or building new small scale 
industries . Local c. rpentry and tailoring shops could increase their 
output , perhaps by forming co- operatives to purchase power machinery . 
Gradually , planners should ensure that every locality t~oughout xhe 
nation acquires a pole of growth. industry , or a cluster of projects , 
large enough to create backwards links to stimulate the development of 
local raw materials; and forwards to facilitate production . of essential 
consumer necessities and increasingly complex tools and equipment . 
In later plan periods , Zimbabwe should seek to co- operate with its · 
neighbours , as re- oriented road and railroad networks facilitate th~ 
spread regional trade outside Soutry Africa , to build bigger pole of growth 
projects , basic industries large enough to augment productivity through 
more extended backwards and forwards linKages with smaller f acilities in 
each country. 
4. Given the relative surplus of un- and under-employed labour , as well as 
wel~ as the scarcity of capital , especially in the early phases of the 
industrial strategy , planner~ should seek to introduce relatively labour- , 
rather than capital-, intensive technologies . Decisions as to which 
technology to employ in particular projects should not be left to 
transnational corpora te bidders eager to sell their surplus capital 
equipment . Rather, they should be made following investigation and 
careful cost- benefit analyses of the range of possible alternatives . 
For some indu~tries , of ccurse , relat~vely capital- intensive machinery 
is essential. This is? frequently true for plants proeessing crude 
materials for export where ~ost and Quality of output must be competitive 
on the world market • . It is also true for heavy industries , such as those 
producing steel ,, smelting and refining cop er , manufacturing petrochemicals , 
etc . Nevertheless , for every branch of indus try , even these , 
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available technolgies range from relatively more labour- to more capital-
intensive technologies . Zimbabwean planners should make every effort , 
taking into consider~ tion the particular industry and its anticipated role 
in the economy , to identify and utilise relnti~ely more labour-intensive 
technologies for each branch. 
To facilitate the identification of appropriate technologies , Zimqabwe could 
join with its neighbours to establish a regional feasibility-study unit . 
Staffed with qualified experts , and with access to a still b~o~der inter-
national group of specialists , such a unit could help national planners 
determine which technologies seem appropriate at the lowest possible 
costs for all branches of regional industry. Within Zimbabwe , available 
engineering talent at the university , as well as in the broader community , 
could draw on the unit's findings to adapt relatively labour-intensive 
technologies to local possibilities and needs . 
Over the longer term, as each nation and the region accumulates the 
necessary capital and skills , planners could begin to introduce increasingly 
sophisticated technologies to hasten the process of spreading productivity 
throughout the regional economy. 
In short , Zmi babwe needs to formulate a long- .term industrial strategy , 
taking into consideration both national and regional potentials , to 
develop industrial capac6ty to create a balanced economy capable of 
creating increasingly productive employment opportunities and raising 
living standards in every sector. 
• 
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The Necessi~ for Institutional Change . 
Implementation of a long-term industrial strategy , as the experience of third 
world countries everywhere attests , requires two sets of institutional change : 
first 1 to ensure increased partidipation of the mass of low income wage 
earners , underemployed urban dwellers and peasants in the state structure ; and , 
second , to exert state control over the ' commanding heights ' - basic industries , 
expor~import and internal wholesale trade , and banks and financial 
institutions . 22 
Attainment of both sets of institutional changes is rendered particularly 
difficult in Zimbabwe because the Lancaster House Agreement enshrined in 
office the civil service appointed by the previous regime and sought to guar-
antee pre-existing property relationships . The liberation armies , which clearly 
had won the support of all classes of the African population (their very 
existence during the decade of armed struggle depended on that support) 
created the preconditions for taking over state power. But their election 
victo~ init~ally permitted only a few of the thousands of educationally-
qualified Zimbabweans - most of whom were educated abroad during UDI - to move 
into top-level ministerial posts and begin the long, complex manoeuvres 
required to alter the institutional structures to permit more effective 
participation by the broader mass of the population at all levels of government . 
The recalcitrant civil service , in hindering the new government ' s efforts to 
increase the participative nature of the state structure , enhanced the always 
present danger that the interests of the individuals who attained office 
within the pre- existing authoritarian structure might become increasingly 
divorced from the aspirations of the impoverished urban and rural population • 
. 
The transnational corporations and financial institutions , who still hold sway 
over key sect0rs of the national economy , seek to cement ties with the new 
office holders and educated Africans in an effort to replicate the "Kenyan 
Model" . * Increasing numbers of e~ucated Zimbabweans , some who had remained in 
• 
the country throughout the war , others who returned shortly before or after the 
elections , have before received offers of highly- paid directorships or salaried 
posts in an increasing range of domestically- based companies and transnational 
corporate affiliates . 
* A former colonial official in Kenya , Sir Michael Blundell , in his book , 
So ROUgh a Wind , had urged Kenyan whites to agree to independence, prophesying 
that by bringing a few Africans into the government and property- owning groups~ 
it would be possible to protect the status quo . 23 . Colin Leys ' analysis shows 4 
how the. s~pcessful implementation of that manoeuvre led to continued impover-
ishment of the majority of the African population. 
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Examination of the externally dependent ties of the inherited Zimbabwean economy , 
especially its close industrial and financial links with transnational corpora-
tions and financial institutions with regional headquarters in South Africa , under-
scores the necessity of pressing ahead to exert democraticised state control o~er 
the commanding heights in order to end dependence on South Africa qnd implement a 
longterm industrial strategy. 
Most , if not all , transnational manufacturing corporations with holdings in 
Zimbabwe have located their primary regional manufacturing facilities in South 
. Africa. 25 They have little incentive to further integrate Zimbabwe manufacturing 
production in the context of a reconstructed Zimbabwean economy . Their Zimbabwean 
factories , with the exception of those processing locqlly- produced gocds and 
mineral ores , are primarily last stage a~sembly and processing plants . They 
were initially established in response to the previous regime ' s pressures to 
retain a foothold ~n the Zimbabwean market . From their perspective , it makes 
little sense to build new , integrated pr0jects in Zimbabwe that would inevitably 
compete with their South African and/or nverseas factories . They undoubtedly 
stand to gain more , from their own relatjvely shortterm profit perspective , by 
selling new machines to replace those worn out during UDI . Then they could 
simply continue to ship in parts and mn±erials +o fabricate the limited range 
of goods needed to meet the demru1d of the existing high income market now 
perhaps including a few Africans to 3Upplement their sales in the larger 
South African market . 
If transnational corporate managers become persuaded to make new investments in 
Zimbabwe , they will inevitably focus on integrating these , too , into their 
regional and international holdings , rather than calculating how they may con-
tribute to restructuring the Zimbabwe~ economy to meet the broader needs of 
the ma.jori ty of the population . Anglo American Corporation, for example , which 
owns a substantial segment of Zimbabwean mines and estate activities , 26 remains 
despite its extensive links with British and US firms - the leading mining 
finance house in South Africa . It is closely intertwined with the South African 
regime ' s parastatals and other dvmestic manufacturii~ and mining interests there . 27 
From Anglo's globa~ profit- maximising perspective , it would be clearly preferable 
to import machinery and equipment if possible from it3 own South African or 
transnational affiliates for the proposed thermal plant using its coal deposits . 
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Anglo has no interest in seeing the creation of an electric power grid incorpor- , 
~ating Cabora Bassa, Kcriba and Kufue projects and strengthening the independence 
of, the national and regional economy from South Africa. Like\·rise , every one of 
the major transnational corporations with investments in Zimbabwean industry, light 
or heavy , owns more important producing and manufacturing plants in South Africa . 
They may be expecied to seek to ma~mise their returns by purchasing from those 
plants whatever machinery nnd equipment they require to maintain and expand 
their dominatit.Dn of the Zinibabwean economy. To leave decisions as to what 
invespw.ents to make, what machinery to buy and where to buy it , how many worker s 
to employ and what to pay them , whether to use Zimbabwean or imported prrts and 
materials , in the hands of these transnational corporate managers is to condemn 
Zimbabwe to a replication and further extension of its inherited distorted , 
externally dependent pattern. 
The existing export- import houses , together with the interna wholesale trading 
fil:ms typically affiliated with them , will tend to re- inforce the counter- produc-
tive impact of transnational corporate decisions . They have built long-
established trade channels through the South African ;regional headquarters o:fl.~ 
transnational manufacturing, agricultural and mining firms . They strengthened 
and deepened these conduits during UDI when they collaborated with Rhodesian and 
South African based parastatal and private firms to evad~ sanctions . Importing 
firms throughout the third world h?ve discovered that they can reap higher profits 
from the import of luxury and semi-luxury i terns, or the parts and ma.terials to 
produce them for the high- income ,group , than by searching out other sources of 
machinery and equipment to build Zimbabwean factories to meet the basic needs of 
lo_!~-income buyers . Widespread international experience indicates , furthermore, 
that import houses often collaborate with locally- based affiliates of trans-
national firms to overinvoice imports, thus shipping out undetected profits to 
avoid domesticc taxes . 28 
On the export side , trading firms are unlikely to seek out new morkets for the 
sale of increasingly processed Zimbabwean agricultural and mineral exports . 
They, too, over the years, especially during UDI, have formed profitable outlets 
through affiliated firms, most of them based in South Africa . Their South 
African or overseas buyers typically seek the lowest priced inputs for their 
own factories, rather than facilitating Zimbabwean industrial processing to 
facilitate sales to new markets . 
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The transnational banks that conauct the major sh~re of the bankiug business in 
Zimbabwe are similarlf tied into the network of transnational manufacturing and 
trading firms based in South Africa . The two British banks , Barclays and Standard, 
that dominate Zimbabwe •s banking business , together own almost two- thirds of 
South Africa •s banking assets . Both , over the last century , have become closely 
interwoven through financial arrangements and director ships with the agricultural, 
• 
mining, manufacturing and tradirg interests which still cement Zimbabwe ' s economy 
into the South African orbit . 
A review of Barclays ' linkages illustrates this point . In the mid 1970s , at 
the height of the liberation war , Barclays boasted 37 branches and 50 fixed and 
mobile age'ncies in Zimbabwe . It "tdvertised29 that sancti ons or no sanctions -
11Baxclays today has more than 5 000 offices thro~ghout the \o~orld and str esses as 
part of its servic.es its strong internationalism. It operates from the Salisbury 
office a business and trade promotion division II 
At the same time Barclays was, and remains South Africa's leading bank, with over 
a thousand branches spread throughout that country and Namibia . Its South African 
profits still comprise over a tenth and a third , respectively, of those of its 
British parent and ~clays International . Barclays helped finance Anglo Amer ican 
Corporation at its birth. Anglo remains one of B~clays , South Africa ' s biggest 
customers , and , owning 3~~ of its capital , its largest South African shareholder. 
Directors of a majority of South Africa •s oligopolistic mining finance houses 
Barlow, Anglovaal and Union Corporation , as well as Anglo itself - sit on Bar clays, 
South Africa ' s board of directors . 
Barclays , South Africa also owns shares in Union Acceptances , Ltd., (UAL), 
originally established by Anglo- American in collaboration with the London- based 
, 
Lazard Brothers . In the 1970s , UAL merged with two other South African banks , 
Ned bank anti Syfrets , to create the banking conglomerate , Nedsual. Nedsua.l bwns 
?CP;( of the third largest bank in Zimbabwe , Rhobank. Rhobank, the only Zimbabwean 
bank with any significant local shareholding - 3~f of its shdres are held by local 
European interests - engaged in financing tobRoco trade throughout the sanctions 
period . Rhobank •s merchant bank , Neficrho , presumably through its South Afr i can 
ties, assisted local and tramma tional firms to obtai n export and import finance 
and foreign exchange during UDI. Barclays , st~.ndard and Grindlays::·assisted the 
Rho"desian regime •s Industrial Development Corporation to build up private sector 
manufacturing operations during UDI , enabling tnem to find necessary f i nance as 
well as secure esLential imported inputs from transnat1onal corporat" manufacturers 
* The ~S l;Jank, Ci3tcorp, o•ms 4~;6 of the nhares of the British parent, Na t ional 
Grindlays ~~. • 2A/ 
........ 
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to keep the business going. 
Given these close relationships with South Africa ' s financial and manufacturing 
sector s , the major banks dominating Zimbabwe ' s bahking scene seem unlikely to 
volunt~ily contribute to financing the reconstruction and erowing self- reliance 
of Zimbabwe . They are more likely to in~ist that the government leave the 
critical industrial sector in the hands of their transnational corporate clients . 
They will undoubtedly eagerly agree to make loans guar anteed by the governmment 
of course ! . - to firo.ance projects like the proposed thermal plant at v/ankie, for 
that would profit , not only~their clients , but themselves. To the extent that 
the governmertt finds itself ircrea.singly in debt to these transnational financial 
interests , it will lose its freedom to implement a longterm industrial strategy 
directed more towards fulfi lling its national requirements and the possibilities 
of achieving closer regional integration outside South Africa ' s influence . * 
Through what institutional changes the new government of Zimbabwe may choose to 
exercise increased control over these commanding heights of the economy will 
require careful &tudy. Tr.e experience of independent African states throughout 
the continent, however, underlines the necessity to do so . 33 The previous regi me 
intervened extensively in the economy , not oQly through typ~cal state capitalist 
tax an,d tariff incentives , but also through pa.rastatals . Operating autonomously , 
in line with the British- South African model , as much like private firms as · 
pd!sible , these collaborated closely wi~h transnational corporate subsidiaries 
in violation of s~tctions to obtain advanced technologies and capital for the 
growing manufacturing sector . They arew heavily on investable surpluses 
accumulated domestically by insur~tce firms and pension funds to finance new 
ventures . A small clique of locally- based Europeans many with close ties 
to the top civil service and politicians - controlled the boardM of direct~rs 
of these parastatals , and focussed their activities on supplementing and support-
ing profitable enterprises in the private sector . These institutions remain 
intact . As a matter of first Priority , if Zimbabwean planners aim to formulate 
and implement a long term industrial strategy , they must imm~diately explor e how 
the Goverr~ent may reorganise this inherited structure of state intervention , 
~ I 
* A long list of examples may be cited of countries which , having accumulated 
foreign debts , fow1d themselves unahle to re1ay \oJithout International Monetary 
Fund assistance. That assistanc'e they discovered was accompanied by require-
ments to withdraw state intervention, designed to restructure the economy , to 
reduce social service3 , and to devalue the~2 currencies , thus reducing the real 
incomes of the majority of the population . 
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particularly in the critical areas of the commanding heights . In this , 
they may draw on extensive African experience , especially that of the n~ighbour­
ing countries which share their steted longterm peropectiv-es . Over time , to 
the extent that Zimbabwe ' s planners join thc$e of neighbouring countries to 
formulate and develop regional plans , it is to be hoped that they will 
increasingly also focus on techniques for attain.ing joint state control of the 
regi~nal commanding heights . 34 
Summary and Conclusion 
Zimbabwe ' s irherited manufacturing sector , while somewhnt larger then that of 
its independent neighbours , nevertheless tends to aggravate the uneven develop-
ment and externaldependency of the national economy . Expanding rapidly during 
UDI, Zimbabwean manufacturing industries , pressed by state intervention to 
achieve import substitution, remain: dominated by transnational corporations , 
especially those with regional head~uarters in South Africa; producers of _ . 
. 
luxury and semi- luxury items for the narrow hi_h income group ; heavily depen-
dent on the import of machinery and e(!uipment , as well as intermediary parts , 
and materials ; located mainly in Salisbury and Bulawayo , aggravating uneven 
development; and relatively capital-inte11Sive , providing relatively few jobs 
for the growing numbers of un- and underemployed , 
The new Zimbabwean government , bent on restructuring the national economy to 
increase productive employment opportunities and raise living standards , needs 
to begin now to carry out research ami the . institutional changes required to 
formulate and implement a longterm industrial strategy . This strategy could 
ensure that the manufacturing sector, attaining, over tirne , an increasing 
balance with expanding.~gricult~·al output and rural development , produces : 
tools and equipment at appropriate levels of technology to increase productivity 
in all sectors of the economy; low cost consumer necesnities , including pro-
cessed foodstuffs , clothin and housing material's ; and , eventually increasingly, 
the basic industrial out:puts characteristic of devel~pcd economies . To the 
. 
extent that Zimbabwean planners can co- opel·ate ~-1i th those of neighbouring 
I 
countri~s , it should be possible to realise far p,reat~r specialisation and 
exchange to permit utilisation of available economies of scale in the construc-
tion of larger basic industries . This should lead to the emergence of a 
fully developed, industrialised regional ~conomy , accompanied by rising living 
standards for the mass of the regional P''pulation, within the comparatively 
short period of half a century . 
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African experience underscores that , to implement this kind of a longterm 
strategy , the new government will have to initiate measures as quickly as possibl e 
.. 
to caxry through two sets of institutional changes . The first should ensure 
that working people in both the ' formal wage ' and the ' informal ' sector , tpgether 
with the peasantry , participate increasingly effectively at every level of 
government machinery to ensure that it remains responsive to their basic needs . 
The second would give goverrunent adequate control over the commanding heights 
basic industries , export- import and internal wholesale trade , and financial 
J 
institutions to ensure that new investment decisions are in fact made in 
accord with the longterm industrial strategy to reconstruct the national economy. 
Over time , through increasing co- vperation , it is to b~ hoped that the planners 
of Zimbabwe and its neighbours will be able to link their national plans into a 
longterm regional strategy to increase productive employment opportunities and · 
raise living standards throughout the entire region. 
· .. -.. ·.:· .. : .. -.:· .~. 
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